http://highschool.rivals.com/content.asp?CID=892888 Arkansas coach punts traditional game plan: Kevin Kelley decided to flip football convention on its head after Pulaski (Ark.) Academy’s second game of the 2007 season. Never a fan of taking his offense off the field, the coach became miffed when his Bruins punted away to Pine Bluff (Ark.) Dollarway High only to see Pulaski allow an 80-yard touchdown on the return. “That was stupid,” Kelley said. “We should’ve gone for it.” The “never punt” philosphy paid off as Pulaski celebrated a state title. As a result, his 2008 team did not punt during 14 games. Such an unorthodox strategy may seem like lunacy, but it was successful: Pulaski won the 5A state title on Dec. 6. Kelley’s team only punted twice in 2007 − once as an act of sportsmanship to prevent running up the score − and never after that Dollarway game. Kelley has reasons to go for it. Keeping the offense on the field on fourth down allows for more creative play-calling. Third-and-long does not have to be a passing down. The Little Rock school can run the ball, throw a screen pass or use any number of formations. Defenses do not know whether to use a nickel or dime defense. And Pulaski’s offense has less pressure on third down. “We don’t really worry too much about it,” quarterback Spencer Keith said. “We just get as many yards as we can. We don’t have to go for the first down.” If Pulaski converts on fourth down, it creates a momentum change similar to a turnover. Other high school coaches have told Kelley they would rather see his team punt. The Bruins even avoid punting when the defense has stopped them inside their own 10-yard line. "You can just tell people are in the stands thinking, ‘You’re an idiot,’ " Kelley said. Kelley supports this rationale with numbers analysis. If Pulaski has a fourth-and-8 at its own 5-yard line, Kelley said his explosive offense likely will convert a first down at least 50 percent of the time. If it fails to convert, statistical data from the college level shows that an opponent acquiring the ball inside the 10-yard line scores a touchdown 90 percent of the time. If Pulaski punts away (i.e., a 40-yard punt with a 10-yard return) the other team will start with the ball on the 38-yard line and score a touchdown 77 percent of the time. The difference is only 13 percent. An innovative and statistics-minded coach, Kelley had tinkered with eschewing the punting game since winning his first state championship in 2003. He became further emboldened after reading several studies, including “Do Firms Maximize? Evidence from Pro Football,” by University of California-Berkeley economics professor David Romer. Kelley also examined ZEUS, a computer program developed by Chuck Bower, who has a doctorate in astrophysics, and Frank Frigo, a game theory expert, to model and predict football outcomes. The Pulaski coach has adopted an unusual approach to kickoffs as well. About 75 percent of the time, he uses an onside kick instead of a standard kickoff. To illustrate why, Kelley again relies on numbers. If his team does not recover the onside kick, the opponent likely will field the kick around its own 47-yard line. On a typical kickoff, the other team usually starts around the 33-yard line. “You’re only giving up 14 yards,” Kelley said. “And you get a chance to get the ball.” Pulaski features seven different kinds of onside kicks, including bunching eight players on one side of the field and three on the other; faking the kick with one kicker while another player shifts over to kick to a vacated spot in coverage; clustering all 11 players before spreading out just as the ball is kicked; bouncing a hard kick off the turf for a jump ball and launching a “helicopter kick” by kicking a ball placed on the ground against the tee. The latter strategy causes the ball to spin like a helicopter’s propeller and move like a curveball. “Much like the punting situation, [the onside kick] becomes something the other team has to work on a lot during the week,” Kelley said. “That’s taking time from their preparation against your offense or defense. So it all works towards the common goal.” For Kelley’s objective of winning games with a risky but aggressive offense, Pulaski had the perfect quarterback. Keith, who has received major interest from Louisiana Tech, Arkansas State and several Ivy League schools, could make defenses pay for not stopping the Bruins on fourth down. And if the other team scores off a short field because of a missed fourth-down opportunity, the unflappable passer could compensate by scoring points in a hurry. Kelley called him the most athletic quarterback he has ever coached, and Keith set the state record with 5,308 passing yards this season. He also possesses the requisite accuracy for an offense that threw on about 45 of its 75 plays a game and averaged 570 total yards. “It’s a really fun offense,” Keith said. “I wouldn’t change it for anything.” A possible pre-med or pre-engineering student who scored a 30 on the ACT, Keith has the intelligence to master an intricate scheme, which features pre- and post-snap reads with receivers making adjustments based on coverage. With Keith and several other impact players returning from his 2007 team, Kelley said he knew his team had the potential for a state title this year. When the media asked for his pick of the No. 1 team in Arkansas before the season, Kelley chose Pulaski and consequently received some heat. “It was just confidence in my guys,” he said. “I thought this might be one of the better teams we’ve ever had.” His prediction proved to be on the mark. Although Pulaski lost its first game of the season, 46-29, to West Helena, it reeled off 13 consecutive wins and avenged that Week 1 defeat with a 35-32 state title victory against the Cougars. During the offseason Kelley will begin investigating different football strategies. He also plans to further study the punting game by analyzing specific instances where punting may prove statistically superior. After Kelley searches through data, Pulaski may tweak its approach next year. His 2009 team could punt on occasion, or he may develop a new tactic that defies the norms of football but gives his team an edge. “Just because something’s always been done that way,” Kelley said, “doesn’t mean it should continue to be done that way.” ************************************************************** The numbers may work out pretty well in high school. I would be interested to see how they work out in college and the pros. It may be discussed in the paper referenced. What do you stats nerds think?
LSU did this to Florida last season… went for it 5 times, including 3 times in the fourth quarter, and ended up winning 28-24. If they’d have punted or went for field goals instead, they definitely would have lost.
I bet Michael Lewis has about half a book written on this already…
There are a few articles out there about ZEUS, which was developed with pro football in mind. http://www.gelfmagazine.com/archives/neural_networking_the_nfl.php http://www.gelfmagazine.com/archives/why_nfl_coaches_keep_making_the_wrong_calls.php http://fifthdown.blogs.nytimes.com/2008/11/11/answers-from-zeus-on-week-10/ http://sports.espn.go.com/espn/page2/story?page=zeus/070213
I think I could pretty convincingly demonstrate that punting is sometimes the right play.
I don’t understand how you could never punt. They must have had great field position all year. Any coach not electing to punt in their own red zone would be an idiot.
This worked because it’s high school football and they had a stud quarterback who could lead them through any crazy offensive scheme. I read about a team earlier this year that went like 7 wide on each play, but not every guy went down field. Again, crazy crap that works at the HS level.
Chuckrox8 Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > I don’t understand how you could never punt. They > must have had great field position all year. Any > coach not electing to punt in their own red zone > would be an idiot. That’s the point of the article. Americans are so ignorant of thinking outside the box, that they don’t even consider that current socially accepted strategy is suboptimal. What these guys showed is statistical analysis of each play and how it translates into increase in winning percentage over time. They are admitting that if you fail to convert on 4th down while in your own red zone, the other team is almost guaranteed to score. But their point is that even if they elect to punt, the opposing team’s chances to score do not drop substantially. It’s all cold math.
good article mwvt9
punting is for guys with only one gonad. Real men don’t punt.
Years ago, there was a funny editorial in the NY Times about softball in Central Park. The author contended that if you get a hit in Central Park softball you should never stop running the bases because your chances of running all of them due to errors was much higher than your chances of getting tagged out. It was a metaphor for something or other, but it seems to me to be about the same strategy as never punting. It only works if the team you are playing against sucks.
JoeyDVivre Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > Years ago, there was a funny editorial in the NY > Times about softball in Central Park. The author > contended that if you get a hit in Central Park > softball you should never stop running the bases > because your chances of running all of them due to > errors was much higher than your chances of > getting tagged out. It was a metaphor for > something or other, but it seems to me to be about > the same strategy as never punting. It only works > if the team you are playing against sucks. Punting when you need 5+ yds for 1st down is justifiable. But I just can’t seem to wrap my hands around coaches deciding to punt on 4th and 1
JoeyDVivre Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > Years ago, there was a funny editorial in the NY > Times about softball in Central Park. The author > contended that if you get a hit in Central Park > softball you should never stop running the bases > because your chances of running all of them due to > errors was much higher than your chances of > getting tagged out. It was a metaphor for > something or other, but it seems to me to be about > the same strategy as never punting. It only works > if the team you are playing against sucks. I would venture to guess the team they played in the state championship didn’t suck (at least for a high school team).
Sounds like my college intramural team’s strategy. we were a little smarter about it though. rule 1. always hit it towards a girl 2. run until a guy is throwing towards a guy 3. always slide at each base 4. at home, run through the catcher if it’s not a girl JoeyDVivre Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > Years ago, there was a funny editorial in the NY > Times about softball in Central Park. The author > contended that if you get a hit in Central Park > softball you should never stop running the bases > because your chances of running all of them due to > errors was much higher than your chances of > getting tagged out. It was a metaphor for > something or other, but it seems to me to be about > the same strategy as never punting. It only works > if the team you are playing against sucks.
Good article, tho I agree the team’s offense must be a beast and the opponents well…not so much. Tennis players have a similar dilemma. They used to spin their second serves in to avoid double faults. Now, they just power first and second serves because they know that lollipop second serves get blasted back for winners. There is still plenty of room for statistics to improve on conventional wisdom in sports.
It also depends how good your defense is. The Baltimore Ravens have a better chance of scoring with their defense on the field.
Trogdor Wrote: ------------------------------------------------------- > > That’s the point of the article. Americans are so > ignorant of thinking outside the box, that they > don’t even consider that current socially accepted > strategy is suboptimal. What these guys showed is > statistical analysis of each play and how it > translates into increase in winning percentage > over time. They are admitting that if you fail to > convert on 4th down while in your own red zone, > the other team is almost guaranteed to score. But > their point is that even if they elect to punt, > the opposing team’s chances to score do not drop > substantially. It’s all cold math. Yes, the complete ignorance of all Americans was the point of the article. It is that ignorance that results in a stubborn refusal to accept that punting on 4th and 10 from inside your own 15 is suboptimal. Please. Anyway, great story, good article. Interesting life lesson for high school boys? That aside, unless your punter is a 15 year old ninth grader with a broken ankle, and no one else on the team can lift their leg, I can’t see a coach using a run of success or out of sample statistics to reasonably justify the no-punt game plan over significant lengths of time. I mean not having a place kicker and “going for two” after every score, or forgoing a field goal attempt on fourth and goal… those I can stomach as HS football norms. But not punting from your own 5 in the fourth quarter of a 3 point game is not bucking convention or playing the “cold math”, it is simple stupidity. That of course is my ignorant opinion. However, I’ll add though that it is based on the strict implementation of an “always go for two”, no field goal, limited punt, game plan employed successfully during my 15 years of Madden dominance. Of course, that ignorance might also be the reason I fail to accept that ‘bowling a googly’ is the optimal approach to the more advanced and civilized game of cricket.