Checklist of Errors / TBP

I saw this yesterday on The Big Picture blog and really liked it:

http://www.ritholtz.com/blog/2012/07/checklist-of-errors/


David E. Hultstrom of Financial Architects submitted this list in response to our Checklist of Errors, and its a good one. You can grab a PDF of this here.

Enjoy . . .


I am a long-time reader and thought I could contribute usefully to your checklist, but I don’t want to post – in part because what I want to share is very long (67 items!). I did a similar exercise, “Advice to a Neophyte” with statements and observations that could be turned into errors. I think you would find it useful. It is Appendix 3 of [Ruminations on Being a Financial Professional](https://owa.smarshexchange.com/owa/redir.aspx?C=e16a6c2ddf4b435aaa968e6eddc4d905&URL=http%3a%2f%2fwww.financialarchitectsllc.com%2fRuminations%2520Files%2fRuminations%2520on%2520Being%2520a%2520Financial%2520Professional.pdf), but I have pasted it below for you to increase the chance you will at least glance at it:

**Advice to a Neophyte**

Many experienced Financial Advisors (aka Stock Brokers, Registered Reps, Financial Consultants, etc.) have learned, generally the hard way, what mistakes to avoid. Unfortunately, newer advisors seem to make the same mistakes all over again (and many experienced folks never learn), harming their clients in the process. Many high-quality, experienced advisors tend not to do a great deal of mentoring (though there are exceptions) because the turnover among new advisors is so high it isn’t a good investment of time. Given that dynamic, I thought I would try to set down some advice to a new advisor to try to spare them, and their clients, some of that learning curve.

Conceptually, I am addressing a young niece or nephew who has recently been hired as a financial advisor and who, while intelligent, is a liberal arts graduate with no investment background beyond studying for, and passing, the Series 7 (stockbroker’s) exam. So without further ado, and in no particular order, here is my advice and the things I think you need to know for your new career:

• Stocks beat bonds (because they are riskier), but less consistently than you think.

• Value stocks outperform growth stocks (because people like growth stories and overvalue the companies, particularly in the small cap space), but again, less consistently than you would like.

• Simple beats complicated.

• It almost certainly isn’t different this time.

• Study market history. In particular, read contemporaneous accounts of different periods. As Mark Twain is reputed to have said, “History doesn’t repeat itself, but it rhymes.” As Santayana did say, “Those who cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” And finally, another quote from Mark Twain, “The man who does not read good books has no advantage over the man who can’t read them.”

• Arguably the most valuable function you serve is keeping people on track and not being sucked into the euphoria or panics that periodically seize the market.

• Psychological mistakes are more detrimental than cognitive mistakes. This applies to your clients _and_ you. Study behavioral finance.

• If you get higher compensation to sell a particular product, it isn’t because it is a better product. There is a very strong inverse correlation between what is best for clients and what pays the advisor the most.

• You will tend to be swayed toward products where the costs (including your compensation) are less visible to the client. If you would be uncomfortable disclosing your compensation, avoid the product.

• You have undoubtedly heard and read disclosures that “Past performance is no guarantee of future results.” I would go further: Alpha is ephemeral and past performance is not only not a guarantee of future results, it isn’t even a good indicator of them though it certainly makes investors feel better about what are inherently uncertain decisions.

• You can do a _lot_ worse than simply putting 60% of a portfolio into a total stock market index fund and 40% into a total bond market index fund. You should have a high level of confidence that what you are suggesting is superior to that simple strategy before implementing it.

• Performance may come and go, but costs are forever.

• Never buy an investment that requires someone else to lose for your client to win. Stocks and bonds have a tailwind (on average they make money), while derivatives are a zero sum game that requires someone else to lose money for you to make money. That is unlikely to happen consistently.

• One of the worst things that can happen to you or a client is an early investment that wins big. You will become overconfident of your abilities and proceed to lose much more in the future through imprudent decisions than you initially made on the winner.

• The purpose of fixed income in a portfolio is for ballast. It is not there to increase returns, it is there to reduce risk, hence you should keep the fixed income portion of a portfolio relatively short term, high quality, and currency hedged (if using international fixed income).

• In reality, there are only two asset classes: stocks and bonds. Or as I prefer to think of it, risky assets and safe assets. Non-investment grade bonds are in the risky category. Cash is just a bond with a really, really, really short duration. The investment decision with the biggest impact is the decision of how to allocate the portfolio between those two buckets.

• In a bad market the value of risky assets will decline by approximately half. This is to be expected. When it happens it does not mean that the world is coming to an end.

• Your projections, regardless of the quality of the software used to generate them, have high precision (the numbers have decimal points), but low accuracy (you have no idea what the numbers actually are).

• The projections of market prognosticators have neither precision nor accuracy.

• It isn’t what you don’t know that will hurt you. It’s what you don’t know you don’t know and what you do know that isn’t so. Become a Certified Financial Planner as soon as possible. Join the Financial Planning Association and attend the meetings.

• Don’t buy individual stocks and bonds. You won’t get adequate diversification, you will tend to end up concentrated in certain sectors and in U.S. large growth stocks, and you and your client will make emotional decisions based on how you feel about the company.

• A good company or sector or country isn’t necessarily a good investment and a poor one isn’t necessarily a bad one. In fact the reverse is generally true.

• Don’t confuse price and value. A low-price stock is not a better investment than a high-price stock just as cutting a cake into more slices doesn’t mean there is more cake.

• Don’t buy insurance products or guarantees. High fees and poor performance are the rule rather than the exception. You can’t get something for nothing and you can’t get market returns without market risk.

• Don’t be afraid to reject clients who are irrational, not in your target market, are high maintenance, or that you simple dislike. This is hard to do early in your career, but worth it.

• When marketing, remember deep penetration of a small market beats shallow penetration of a large market.

• Anyone can design a financial plan or portfolio that does well if the assumptions are correct. The trick is to design one that works pretty well even if you are completely wrong.

• Your job is not to maximize portfolio size; it is to maximize client happiness. While these two things are certainly related, they aren’t the same thing.

• Successful people have long time horizons, unsuccessful people have short ones. (In finance terms, the successful folks have lower discount rates than the unsuccessful.) Look for clients and associates who are in the long-term-thinking category.

• Get a mentor who has been in the business a long time but who is bad at sales and started very slowly. He or she is more likely to know what they are doing than the personable sales guy who was an overnight success.

• Sell wisdom, not products or transactions.

• Good clients are wealthy people who delegate.

• Current market valuations frequently change expected returns. They much less frequently change the proper investment strategy

• Financial success is having more than you need.

• One of the best fixed income investments is paying down debt.

• Don’t trust your peers or your firm. If you can’t or won’t do your own due diligence on a product, don’t sell it. If you can’t explain a product to an engineer, don’t sell it.

• 4% is the sustainable withdrawal rate over a 30 year period for a portfolio that is predominately, but not exclusively, stocks.

• IRA and Roth type investments beat insurance products hands down.

• Base your business on fees rather than commissions as much as possible.

• Read books (not magazines and newspapers) on investing (not sales).

• Markets are probably efficient. To the extent they aren’t, you won’t be the one that beats them.

• Diversification is the only free lunch – but it works better when markets are going up than when they are going down.

• If everything in the portfolio is going up, you aren’t diversified.

• Focus on total return, not yield.

• Beware excess kurtosis and negative skewness – particularly in combination.

• As Warren Buffett said, “Be fearful when others are greedy, and be greedy when others are fearful.”

• Don’t change investment strategy when scared or euphoric. Wanting to change your strategy is an early warning sign you are about to do something stupid.

• Over-communicate with clients – particularly in times of market stress.

• Setting appropriate expectations is one of your most important functions.

• Just because “everyone” is doing it doesn’t make it right. This applies to investment fads.

• Taxes and inflation matter a great deal but because they aren’t reflected in performance reports they are inappropriately ignored.

• Taxes should not drive investment decisions though they may influence them at the margin.

• Make sure you are getting experience for the time you are putting in. Few people have 20 years of experience. Many people have the same year of experience 20 times.

• Most mistakes are attributable to ignorance, myopia, and hubris. Principally hubris.

• Wanting or needing x% return doesn’t cause it to be available in the market.

• Returns are random and randomness is more random than you think. Control risk and accept the returns that show up when they show up.

• The difference between wise and foolish investors is that the first focuses on risk while the second focuses on return.

• No one has any idea what the market is going to do in the short run and only a vague idea in the long run. When J.P. Morgan was asked what the market was going to do that day, he replied, “It will fluctuate.” If your business model depends on your ability to forecast, you are doomed.

• Risk doesn’t equal return. You can’t earn excess returns without taking risk, but it is possible to take risks that have no reasonable expectation of excess return

• Leverage works in both directions.

• Your clients cannot eat relative performance.

• Aside from tax management, the wisdom of a trade has nothing to do with the cost basis.

• Don’t mistake a bull market for investment skill.

• As Keynes is reputed to have said, “The market can remain irrational longer than you can remain solvent.”

• People don’t have money problems, money has people problems

• Clients have no idea if you are competent. Thus they will extrapolate from things they can judge into areas where they can’t. For this reason (among others) it is important to do all the other little things right like returning calls, being punctual, having a respectable office, having communications be without grammar and spelling errors, etc.

• The investor’s return is the company’s cost of capital. If you expect a high return, you should ask why a company has to pay that much for capital.

Great list overall, I’m sure this will be very helpful.

I’m not trying to nitpick or down play your excellent list, but I’m wondering if you can explain this bullet:

• The investor’s return is the company’s cost of capital. If you expect a high return, you should ask why a company has to pay that much for capital.

I am very confused about what this means.

If you mean that it is a zero sum game between company and investor where the cost of capital is directly tied to the investors return, that is not the case. The cost of capital is fixed obviously (or pretty close to fixed in the short run), and the investor’s return can fluctuate wildly depending on market forces and what price they pay for the stock. It’s not hard to come up with an example of a stock that is intrinsically “worth” $5.00 a share that has a cost of capital of 10% and is selling for $0.50 currently in the market. If the value calculation is correct, then the investor’s return is far in excess of 10%.

Additionally, the company may earn well above its cost of capital, in which case the investor would earn much more than the cost of capital over time, assuming the company’s capital allocation policy is intelligent (compounding is magical).

The only way I can potentially see for your statement to be true (unless I am way off base in the way I am reading it), is for bond holders, in which the investor is putting capital into low risk assets with a high probability of 100% return of capital at par, such that the investor earns a fixed, knowable coupon rate that is embedded in the company’s cost of capital. This is not the case for equities (nor does it account for the equity risk premium calculation in the WACC).

Anyway, I have been thinking a lot about cost of capital lately and how that drives shareholder returns, which is why I am asking – this bullet jumped out. Can you explain?

Also, this one fundamentally doesn’t make sense:

• Risk doesn’t equal return. You can’t earn excess returns without taking risk, but it is possible to take risks that have no reasonable expectation of excess return

Why would it only work in one direction? Every year there are investment layups with favorable asymmetric risk characteristics that offer substantial upside with little or no downside risk. But without even arguing that point, it’s hard to see why the risk / return paradigm would only be broken in a negative direction.

Anyway, not trying to be overly critical, your list is great bchadwick.

First of all, it’s not *my* list. It’s someone else’s list that I just happen to like. And given that it’s very long, I don’t necessarily agree with each and every point 100%.

I think that it underestimates the ability to find alpha, but given that its target audience is a reasonably intelligent college graduate who knows enough to pass the Series 7 regulatory exam for stockbrokers and has not much other experience, it’s appropriate to warn them that alpha isn’t just sitting out there for the picking like a kindergartener’s easter egg hunt. It’s more like looking for your buddy in the midst of a minefield while bloodhounds are chasing you in the night.

I DO agree with the idea that risk is a necessary but not sufficient condition for returns. Systemic risk does get rewded over the long term, because systemic risk captures profits that come from productivity improvements across the economy as a whole. As long as there are lasting productivity improvements that disseminate across the economy as a whole through either producer or consumer surpluses, you should get beta over the long term, and you get that by having a widely diversified portfolio.

So you can’t get excess return over the long term without taking on risk, and systematic risk will more often than not deliver.

Ideosyncratic risk has a net return of zero across the market as a whole, which means that for every company that beats the market average by a certain amount, another must underperform (though it is possible that one does really really well, and a whole bunch of others underperform by just a little bit). If you are running concentrated pofolios and picking companies blindly, there is NO expectation that accepting this kind of risk has any payoff. You are taking risk here, but there really is no reason to expect any return. So if you realize that you don’t have any skill here, you can still make a good portfolio decision by not exposing yourself to ideosyncratic risk and just hold market indexes.

Now, if you are doing due diligence and have any skill, hopefully you can identify companies that are more likely to end up on the high side than the low side of the average. That’s alpha. Valuation is one way to get at alpha. But the point is that you need to be able to figure out which risks are risks that are likely to pay off, and which ones are just risks that don’t have a positive expected return. Lots of people will simply say, “no risk, no reward,” and although that’s true, the opposite is not: taking risk doesn’t mean you have a positive expected reward.

A good example is Roulette. You take risk, and you may even win (a lot if you bet on one number and it comes up), but over the long term, the house wins 1/33 or 1/17 (depending on the number of 0s) with each bet you make.


The cost of capital is also something I more or less agree with, although his advice doesn’t allow for the possibility low valuation increasing the return temporarily.

If a company wants to raise capital, it can sell stock, and if it just needs to raise a little, the cost of that capital is going to be approximately the current value of the stock. So if the market is pricing the stock for a return of %15, then that is the level of return that the company is going to have to deliver for the investments to have a postive NPV and be worth doing.

In practice, the market demands a return of 15% by using 15% as the discount rate for expected future cash flows, so people aren’t necessarily conscious about demanding 15%, because it’s an intermediate calculation that they just do by rote memory because they’ve been told that’s how to do valuation.

But now you should ask yourself: why does the market discount company activities by so much? Is it really that risky? If it isn’t, then great, go ahead and invest, but if it is, then you aren’t really getting any benefit from the company that you wouldn’t just get from levering up a market index to the same level of volatility (and/or beta, depending on your taste).

I especially like his point about fundamentally, all investments are based on stocks and bonds.

The more layers of abstraction there are, the more likelihood that buyers will forget the underlying and sellers can get away with mispricing.

Chains like Home mortgages -> passthrough securities -> MBSes -> CDOs are dangerous, if you buy the equity tranche in the CDO, what the hell is your share of an individual mortgage payment? How can you calculate returns with any accuracy (not precision) if you can’t model your portion of the expected cash flows?

Except for commodities, FX, private equity, and real estate. Other than that, I have no concerns.

Private equity and real estate are stocks.

You could make the case for PE being stock, though I think the author of the list was talking about public stocks. And I wasn’t talking about REITs.

Real estate is not stocks. REITs are stock-like, though.

Oops, I see that you reposted that bchad, not sure how I missed that. Friday :confused:

Also agree that there are more than two asset classes. I thought that had been pretty well established.

Broadly the author meant that asset classes are divided into ownership interests in assets (stocks) and loans (bonds)…at least that’s how I interpreted it.

Furthermore…it’s aimed at financial advisors whose clients may likely not be investing FX and commodity futures…

Yes, I took issue with the “there are only stocks and bonds” as well, although most advisors are only pushing stocks and bonds. It’s surprising how few advisors really think about diversification beyond stocks and bonds.

That’s not the case anymore. Alternatives are the only thing advisors want to talk about now. The wirehouse guys have been doing it for a while and know what’s up. Edward Jones guys…not so much.

Yes, you’re right. I’ve noticed that alternatives talk is picking up, but *knowlegable* alternatives talk is still very hit-and-miss.

The ability to wrap alternatives into ETFs is a big part of this, I imagine.

Does it really make sense for non-institutional investors to reach into other asset classes? I know it makes sense for the wire houses because they collect a lot of fees for opaque investments, but does it make sense for the investor? Furthermore, how do you “invest” in currencies? You buy a basket? How is that a winning investment strategy? It’s a winning fee structure to be sure though.

No, stocks, bonds and real estate are the way to go for 99% of people out there. Private equity, commodities, and currencies are pretty unforgiving for most people and should be avoided (along with their excessive layered on fees (especially PE, which is now a deflating bubble IMO)).

Larger advisors have moved to a fee-based structure, so they get paid on your assets, not the type of vehicle they put you in. Of course, the investor still has to pay the management fee of whatever they’re in so hedge funds naturally cost more than an index fund. But it’s all the same to the advisor. (Naturally there are still plenty of brokers out there, but they’re a dying breed.)

For clients that have around $500k or more in investable assets alternatives may be a viable option. Below that and it doesn’t make a lot of sense. And, it depends on what we define as an alternative. Everyone uses that term but no one agrees on what it means. REITs used to be considered an “alternative” investment. Now they’re part of just about everyone’s asset allocation. In my experience, advisors/consultants use the term to mean any non-correlated investment. Hedge funds, commodities, PE, private real estate (or direct ownership of commercial properties in the case of institutional clients)…that sort of thing.

My personal opinion is that there’s too much being made about finding non-correlated assets. After 2008 diversification was said to be broken so they’re on a quest to find stuff that will zig when everything else zags. I don’t buy it. I think you can diversify yourself into 3% returns year-over-year if you’re not careful. If/when the next bull market for stocks comes around, people are going to kick themselves for having 20% in crap like long/short market neutral strategies.

When he says that there are only stocks and bonds I take it to mean the investment has an equity orientation (broadly, ownership: PE, stocks, real estate, commodities) or a debt orientation (an obligation owed by one party to another party). Simple, clean and that is generally how I think about it. I think he said “stocks and bonds” to keep it simple for the new financial advisor…equity and debt/fixed income sounds complicated to a liberal arts major, I guess (I am one).

A market neutral strategy is a STRATEGY, not a type of investment. FX investment returns are typically strategy based, as bromion said you are not investing in a basket typically. Also, FX could be thought of in debt in some ways, but I’d have to think about that more.

FX could be thought of as cash or as a result of a strategy…

FX could be thought of as debt, but only in a long-short sense.

FX doesn’t really fit into the debt/equity distinction though, and commodities don’t really, either.

One issue with FX is that there is no risk premium for taking FX risk, because if one currency appreciates, the other will fall. Since both are volatile, they can’t both appreciate with the same expected risk premium. So FX has to be strategy based, whereas stocks and bonds can in principle be buy-and-hold kinds of things.

Not sure why you’re shouting. I was using market neutral strategies as an example of a non-correlated asset class as an alternative investment, not in reference to the list.

Regarding currencies, I think of how they’re being used by institutional investors and advisors that are too smart for their own good. Not the PM that’s taking single currency bets (or hedging). Every currency product I run across is a basket of currencies either benchmarked to the DXY or the Fed’s trade weighted basket. They’re in no way a debt instrument. No interest, no obligation. Just speculation.