INTC

Intel - “old tech” stock, I concede it has a slow lingering terminal illness. But, has generous dividend and buybacks, modest P/E, P/B, and debt. Has grown revenue in last 5 and 10 years (but unlikely that it will in the future.) Nothing scary jumps out from financial statements alone.

I just wonder if this is a cigar butt still worth smoking for a few (next 5 years). Will their chips sell? (All other business lines don’t really amount to much.) Internationally?

Wild speculation: In US, tablets will replace laptops and PCs except in select settings (like CFA charterholders working on spreadsheets). And what happens in US today will happen in the world tomorrow. Intel architecture cannot compete with low-power architectures. Still, how fast in the decline? That is the key question.

I am assuming that whatever gains they make due to data servers and other workhorses using Intel chips, will be miniscule compared to the market share loss to tablets, because of the numbers involved.

Also assuming that AMD or another rival will not rise to beat them at their own game.

I’m long INTC roughly 5% position. I got in at 24.75.

I don’t think its a cigar butt. long story short, those worries you have will go away as Intel catches up on chips for mobile and data centres. It does take time to steer a big ship but I like what i’m seeing in terms of how they’re positioning their chips with Android and the progress they say they’re making on Cloud Computing. Finally, Macafee is a nice add on as i don’t have to mention to you the importance of security in technology.

Also, PC market isn’t going anywhere. Emerging markets will use more PCs and the developed world will see a refresh sooner or later.

AMD won’t beat Intel (how profitable is AMD? not very). Nor will the other fabless manufacturers. Mobile is still growing a still a new thing, just wait a few years. Yes, Intel was slow to the mobile wave, but things will pick up (albeit slowly). In the meantime, they will grow their dividend and I’ll sit patiently.

Intel may be a mega-cap, but it’s not at all what I’d call a cigar butt. They have a huge competitive advantage in terms of their size, technology, and brand.

They spend more on R&D than anyone, additionally, and can spread these costs out over a huge, huge volume of chips, since they sell the most. So even though they spend the most nominal dollars on R&D, as a % of sales, it’s actually less (or at least was last time I looked) than companies like AMD and others playing catch up. This is an example where their size truly allows them some awesome competitive advantages.

For a more complete discussion, see chapter 7 of “Value Investing: From Graham to Buffett and Beyond”. It originally came out 11 years ago and none of the competitive factors mentioned there have changed. Yes, we’re using tech in new ways, but INTC’s competitive advantage is still enormous and intact. In another 11 years, the odds are excellent we’ll still be using intel chipsets. I wouldn’t bet my entire portfolio on it, but I’d be pretty damned comfortable buying into their stock, if I could get it at a good price.

Err…if they have such a huge competitive advantage, why are they struggling in mobile? Furthermore, their brandname is not really relevant, they’re not a consumer product firm, essentially their product is part of a larger product. (People don’t go out to buy Intel phones or computers, I don’t even know whether my computer has intel chips).

I’m neither bullish nor bearish, but I wouldn’t invest in it.

I can’t answer the ‘struggling in mobile’ question, but I would be very surprised if the rise of mobile computing isn’t something that intel can adapt to.

As far as “brandname”, I think we may be talking about their brand differently. While you may be correct that a lot of consumers don’t know or care about Intel’s name, it’s hugely important to the people who design and manufacture PCs. When the next iBook or Dell Optiplex [whatever] is designed, designers aren’t saying, “We’ll go with the Acme processor, they have a 3.5 GHz processor that is very cheap”. They’re figuring out, “OK, which company out there makes reliable processors, that are ultra-cutting edge yet can be made at reasonable cost to us, that can be produced in massive volumes, and delivered by a supply chain that has been battle-tested?” There aren’t many companies that can satisfy those requirements, and a major manufacturer is really unlikely to take a chance on a lesser company.

I would say the same way that Hon Hai’s brand is hugely important. Are they known to the average consumer of Apple products? Does that consumer choose to buy Apple products because Hon Hai assembles them? No, not at all. But does Hon Hai have a really strong reputation among the people who decide to buy from Hon Hai? Yes, absolutely. They’ve proven that they are a top-tier OEM company who can produce competitively priced products, in huge volume, reliably delivered, for major tech companies with exacting quality requirements.

TL:DR; just because a consumer doesn’t know a company’s name does not mean that company’s brand or reputation is irrelevant / non-existant.

EDIT: Palantir, in no way meant to be confrontational or rude. Just explaining my thinking.

The way I see it is that if you’re referring to the hardware designers, then they’re really even less brand sensitive than consumers simply because they’re more knowledgeable buyers, they can objectively compare chips in order to find the best product the way we cannot. Hence I’m skeptical that Intel would have a robust brand name advantage.

Another threat is based on ARM. To my knowledge, ARM is a firm that basically licenses designs to manufacturers. Firms that have a strong competitive advantage of scale in manufacturing (Say TSM) can buy licenses and produce chips at a really low cost, which would compete with Intel on the “efficiency” side, while ARM design would compete on the “high tech” side.

palantir addresses the concerns correctly but you will have to wait and see what happens. I"m sure PO is anxious to see the results as well.

I like to keep in mind that sometimes with investing, you just have to let the company do the work they’re suppose to do. companies will face challenges from industry changes etc. but that is what a company is suppose to do, face challenges. They’re working on it and we’re paid to wait.

Also mobile is only one area.

Intel effectively had no competitior for a long stretch because they were so dominant, and now the challenge finally ermerges. they have all the tools to win, but from a stock’s perspective, they’re given even odds or less.

I’m impressed with the company overall and surprise by its valuation. I dont think you can name too many companies like Intel selling at their value. Even at a quarter more, you problably won’t come near anything as solid quality wise. I think GOOG is a better company at this stage, but its selling for 2.3x that plus it has no dividend. what is certain today may not be so certain tomorrow and the reverse is also true.

supersad, how much do you value it at?

I don’t disagree on your point of “let the company do its job, figuring out problems is what they’re supposed to do”. I’m basically following that line of logic with MSFT and Loews. That being said…overall I think hardware is an industry that could be more and more commoditized in the future which may well trigger business plan changes at Intel…just IMO though.

Have done zero work on the company financials, so I don’t have an answer for you there. Just wanted to explain my thinking on its competitve advantages and why I wouldn’t call it a ‘cigar butt’. To me, a cigar butt is a business that is ludicrously cheap, like a net-net, usually because it has little/no value as an ongoing business. Intel might be cheap (and under pressure), but it definitely isn’t a cigar butt to me.

Might take a swing at putting a rough value on it over the next week if I have a little time during my flights.

It just keeps getting cheaper.

I eased my foot in today, buying LEAPS dated Jan 2014. Calls are hella cheap. I figure either good performance by Intel or increased volatility will both help me.

i really should consider getting options, but i don’t want to lose money…what is your strike price on the Jan 2014?

$30. I debated a long time whether to buy ITM or OTM calls. If I was married to my thesis I would have bought ITM calls. But for no reason except my gut, I feel it’s not as sure a bet as its financials would indicate.

Management has a record of losing their head and buying a ton of crap at inflated prices - last time was 1999-2001.

I’d rather buy BRK and sleep well at night.

Your comment is inaccurate. Current management is not the same as back in 1999-2001.

Management changed hands in 2005 with the appointment of Paul S. Otellini and Bryant as chairman this year.

Yo Frankie. I know you stay away from growth, but I have a sexy growth idea nevertheless. Take a look at NSR, an emerging company with distinct competitive edge over the others, and strong growth rates…their business model is not very understandable at the very beginning, but does start making sense once you read into it.

why does everybody say I’m not into growth? GOOG, INTC, TEVA, CME are all predicated on decent (though perhaps not extreme) growth

I will take a look at NSR,but how do you feel on the valuation? just looking at the 5 year historicals it looks as though its price on the high range (higher than GOOG).

but i will read their annual report sometime soon and get back to you.

I’m actually looking into AIG at the moment though have not pulled the trigger.

They do have expected growth baked in, but when we (at least I do) say growth, we mean emerging companies with recently proven business models that have a lot of room for expansion. That doesn’t describe the ones you mentioned.

The price is high, sure, but 2 points 1) FCF>NI, so PE ratio will overestimate valuation. 2) The business model is emerging, so firms like this are going to be expensive.

The way I see it is you really have to look at expansion opportunities, and a PE of 20 can become very cheap if these are realized. Remember, AAPL had a PE of 50 early in the decade, and it has slowly but steadily declined to 13…

I hear ya P.

but INTC has great room for expansion and so does GOOG. you’re right in that they’re not “emerging” companies though GOOG has the best growth prospect of any company I have found up to date (their financials also support this I believe).

but i will take a look and get back. kinda busy with a few ideas but will certainly take a peak.

Haha, what a big change. Otellini has been with Intel since 1974 and Bryant since 1981. IIRC Otellini headed the chip group in 1999-2001 and Bryant was the CFO.

http://newsroom.intel.com/community/intel_newsroom/bios?n=Paul%20S.%20Otellini&f=searchAll

http://newsroom.intel.com/community/intel_newsroom/bios?n=Andy%20D.%20Bryant&f=searchAll

Palantir,

I looked at NSR. So quickly

  1. my level of comprehension for this company is weak to none though I get a sense of their moat (i sense a lot of proprietary databases they possess a competitior cannot easily replicate). Ironically, I’m still not 100% sure what they do.

  2. the balance sheet stuffed with Goodwill from recent acquisition makes it a bit troubling though my sense is the balance sheet matters little to none in this case.

  3. Valuation appears high given historical growth rate. However, if you understand this company than valuation could be justify. Numbers wise and strictly numbers wise, its not super impressive though certainly above average.

Intuitively, after reading the main sections of the 10k, i sense this is a good company. However, its not easy enough and certainly outside my realm of understanding at the moment. I will continue to read about this company though. thanks for the suggestion. if you got any news on these guys, keep me up to speed. I’m still intersted.

Definitely, appreciate your thoughts, your points make sense, it’s not really in my circle of competence either, so I’m trying to learn more about this.

Anyways, here is some info, a post from 08 on VIC can explain it better than I can.

http://www.valueinvestorsclub.com/value2/Idea/ViewIdea/3353

NeuStar, Inc. NeuStar represents the opportunity to invest in a firm that possesses pseudo-monopoly status; is largely insulated from economic fluctuations and seasonality; holds relatively long-term government contracts; enjoys high structural barriers to entry, which include switching costs for customers that are enormous; and is vitally important to the second-by-second stability of the telecommunications systems of North America. The world of technology, and especially old technology, is usually a zero-sum game. Simplifying and enhancing one user’s experience involves managing exponential complexity elsewhere in the value chain. NeuStar was born out of the desire to give consumers “number portability.” For those unfamiliar with the industry, it was not too long ago that there only existed a finite set of phone carriers. That wall fell, and resulted in tremendous telecom competition—from cable companies to the likes of Vonage, etc., today. A second step in giving users choice was the ability to “port” their phone numbers. Thus, if customers have Verizon Wireless today and want to sign up for say the new iPhone at AT&T, they can take their numbers with them—the numbers are “portable.” That portability implies that phone routing evolved from using static routing tables to dynamic ones. NeuStar’s business is managing complexity in the “system.” As telecom converges from different sources (VoIP, cable, mobile, etc.) and we `introduce an increasing number of elements in the systems (SMS, video, IM, etc.), complexity increases exponentially. It’s this ever-increasing level of complexity that creates a lasting moat around NeuStar’s critical, recurring revenue model. Number Portability and the Communications Industry Twenty years ago, Ma Bell dominated the U.S. telecommunications industry. After the Bell break up, it was decided that all phone number assignments would then be fixedly divided amongst the various, new communications service providers (CSPs) that emerged—each with its own distinct network. For example, all numbers that began with “212-555-XXXX” might have been Verizon’s responsibility, while those with “215-777-XXXX” might have been AT&T’s. One of the advantages of structuring the industry as such was the increased ease of processing a call from, for instance, a “212-555-XXXX” number to a “215-777-XXXX” number. Though they had different networks and systems in place, Verizon and AT&T knew from which CSP each call was coming from, and to which CSP each call was supposed to be forwarded. Moreover, CSPs needed to know the source and destination not only for routing, but also for billing. In addition to routing and billing, it was also necessary to verify that the source was really who s/he claimed to be (authentication), otherwise billing would flawed. So CSPs needed routing, billing, and authentication just to provide number portability. Furthermore, it is important to remember that the same logic applies for SMS messages, data transfers, etc. With a legacy phone network using an addressing scheme that was designed to be static sitting on top of a network that is inherently dynamic and now fragmented, there needed to be a hub to manage or “clear” these changes. That clearinghouse had to be “neutral”—unaffiliated with any telecom service provider. NeuStar filled this critical void. Company History NeuStar first began operations as the Communications Industry Services (CIS) division under Lockheed Martin in 1996. On October 9, 1997, Lockheed was officially designated the North American Numbering Plan Administrator (NANPA), “an impartial numbering administrator [that makes] telecommunications numbering available on an equitable basis.” The “impartial” bit is very important—the NANPA was required by statute and regulations to administer services in a “fair, unbiased, and non-discriminatory manner,” and could not be “aligned with any particular telecommunications industry segment.” To me what this means is that anyone that potentially has the capability to be a competitor (e.g., AT&T) would be restricted from doing so. In 1998 Lockheed announced its intentions to acquire Comsat Government Services, a wholly owned Comsat subsidiary at the time, “to facilitate the strategic aims of Lockheed Martin’s newly formed Global Telecommunications subsidiary.” Because of the likely conflict of interests that would arise between Lockheed’s CIS arm and its expanding Global Telecom group, Lockheed had originally planned to directly sell the division to Warburg Pincus. However, the FCC did not approve of this move due to (again) neutrality violations—Warburg had substantial telecom holdings at the time. Thus, ultimately Lockheed ended up deciding to divest CIS to a newly organized corporation (i.e., NeuStar) and Warburg. A dual class voting structure allowed the deal to be consummated within Warburg. http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Common_Carrier/Orders/1999/fcc99346.txt After the acquisition was completed in November 1999, NeuStar was essentially an independent, unaffiliated entity—the ideal, centralized clearinghouse administrator for the government and CSPs. Jeffrey Ganek has served as NeuStar’s Chairman and CEO ever since the 1999 acquisition. And even before then, he was Senior VP and Managing Director of Lockheed CIS from 1999 until the divestiture. Ganek has built and grown the organization since inception. The management team is by all measures honest, forthright and focused on delivering shareholder value. I think their investor presentation off NeuStar’s website is an excellent resource to learn about the businesses, capital structure, and future prospects of the company: http://library.corporate-ir.net/library/18/189/189420/items/280284/analystday_finalfinal.pdf NeuStar’s business is broken into three primary business lines. 1) Addressing NeuStar maintains the authoritative database of North American telephone numbering resources. In other words, NeuStar is the agency responsible for assigning, for example, “212-333-XXXX” numbers to Sprint, “212-222-XXXX” numbers to T-Mobile, etc., and other similar allocation services. As CSPs register new clients, they need unused phone numbers to assign to those clients. NeuStar is the entity carriers turn to when they require such addressing services. 2) Interoperability This is the piece of the business that facilitates number portability, as mentioned previously. With the advent of multiple CSPs after Bell’s dissemination, the structure of the telecommunications industry had to adapt to the new environment. Before number portability, one could only switch service providers by changing his/her phone number. Because this was extremely inconvenient for the general public, the government decided to mandate number portability in the 1990s. Now, with portability, one is able today to buy a new iPhone and still retain an original Verizon Wireless number. NeuStar’s interoperability services ensure that this is possible. These services allow carriers to query NeuStar’s database, route calls appropriately, and handle billing and other necessary functions for one carrier to “interoperate” with another carrier. 3) Network Infrastructure Constant changes in the communications service industry require providers to make frequent and extensive changes in their own network infrastructure. NeuStar manages carrier vendor changes in a centralized fashion. In other words, instead of a CSP reporting a change to all carriers, the CSP would report the change to NeuStar, and NeuStar would then propagate the change for the entire industry. These changes may result from technology upgrades, network modification and optimization, or reorganization of network traffic. Imagine there was a cable cut on a CSP infrastructure and it was necessary to reroute the communications trunk. The CSP would report the change to NeuStar, and NeuStar would deal with communicating that change to all other carriers. There is a very good slide in the investor relations presentation that illustrates this. All three of NeuStar’s businesses are intimately intertwined. NeuStar is the authoritative “clearinghouse” that allows for a competitive telecom services environment in the United States. Competition (or Lack Thereof) NeuStar’s revenue is all fee-based, and these fees are determined by long-term and renewable government contracts. Think of the firm as a regulated utility whose cost structure is far more favorable. I will spare you the Porter analysis, but suffice to say that while NeuStar is dependent on its government mandates, this is one boat no one in the country would want to rock. In providing clearinghouse services the FCC cares about reliability—NOT cost. The relative cost savings to the telecom companies is inconsequential to the end users of telecom services, but the inherent risk of a service disruption on those users is not. Is this a good business? I think the numbers speak for themselves. From a realistic standpoint, it is fairly intuitive to see why NeuStar has, contractually, a very stable market position. What would happen if the government decided to prematurely terminate NeuStar’s contracts? Chaos would honestly overwhelm the North American continent. People talk about “too big to fail” with Fannie and Lehman… Well, NeuStar is too important to ever fail. The success of each telephone call and SMS message relies on NeuStar; all of us depend on NeuStar every single day. Furthermore, NeuStar has developed such a veteran expertise in this highly specialized field over the years (since the very beginning, actually) that giving another firm the job would be akin to asking a midwife to lead a surgical brain operation. Money, time, efficiency, and societal stability would all be sacrificed. I think the policymakers have their hands full at the moment with the banks. Most people have and will never hear about NeuStar, and as an investor, I hope it stays that way because the day they do is the day NeuStar probably dropped the ball and the government decided to scrutinize the company’s monopoly status. In short, I think the risk of non-renewal of these contracts is more contractual than real. Growth Opportunities The company has grown fast and shows no signs of abating. Between acquisitions in related spaces in which one can immediately fold in the high cost structure on to the firm’s already in place data centers, it is possible to do very accretive transactions. As more and more countries look to provide number portability, NeuStar is the entity they turn to for those services. While the obvious benefits of earnings growth exist, I think diversification of the revenue base is even more important. The very important option to the NeuStar business is their hosted IM business. SMS is a huge business and IM on the phone represents an equally important growth opportunity should it take off. NeuStar has a hosted platform for offering this service to operators, and I not only think that this could meaningfully change things, but also feel that the current stock price provides this very valuable option for free. It has the same dynamic as the firm’s core business—that is, connect users via IM on different platforms, such as Yahoo, Google, MSN, etc. Complexity means money for NeuStar. Valuation In approaching valuation we looked at a draconian low case where the company virtually comes to a standstill in terms of growth. If you assume that and a low 9X EBIT multiple in three years. It is clear that downside is virtually non-existent. Our high case is actually one where we come in line with guidance but still assume no stock-buy backs, or similarly accretive transactions. We would argue that a business with those growth levels, competitive position, and economics deserves at least 11X EBIT multiple but under these assumptions you get a double on the stock, a 3 year IRR of 27% with multiple free-options to move well beyond that (stock-buybacks, acquisitions, IM platform growth, multiple expansion etc) Summary This is an exceptional business, as measured by pre-tax ROIC, that exhibits the economics of a software model but with a recurring revenue stream. It is still growing robustly as management is able to re-deploy the firm’s excess capital in an accretive manner through global expansion, tuck-in acquisition, and material share buybacks—all under the umbrella of a highly protected market position. I would highly recommend looking at the recent presentation by the CEO at the Wedbush Morgan presentation, it really highlights the business, the future opportunity, and I think the prudent capital allocation mindset of management. NeuStar is very conservatively capitalized, and earnings growth coupled with stock buybacks and multiple expansion should lead to very high IRR’s over the next three years with little realistic downside. NeuStar is both safe and cheap. Risks · Customer concentration · Non-renewal of contract(s) · System failure that increases risk on non-renewal